借我一把雨傘好嗎？
6/23/2008
[movie]台北電影節6/22心得
6/22 (日)
今天連看了三部，哇....
超滿足!! ^^
第一部片是紀錄片 無用 片長80分鐘
第二部片是 市川崑物語 片長83分鐘
第三部片是 渴 片長110分鐘
三部都非常的好看，呼~讓我鬆了一口氣，選對片了阿~
嚴格上來說，第一片跟第三片都有些沉悶，
市川崑物語則是用一種較詼諧的語氣來記錄市川崑的一生
岩井俊二拍的片子，不知道為什麼聽音樂就覺得很像他會拍的片子
無用一片的內容，我發覺看過之後我很難說的明白，
不過我覺得很棒的地方是這個記錄片的批判性不強，
而且也不是那種什麼勵志型的片子，
乍看會覺得有些平淡，
但實際上卻有很多值得思考的切入點
像是設計師本人對於衣服的省思
對於手工製成跟生產線製造的比較；
小型服裝修改業者的生活片段，
以及大型工廠裡頭加工業者的集體生活，
在在都顯出了導演想讓人注意到的議題，
但又有所保留的讓觀眾自己去詮釋情況，這一點
讓我十分的欣賞。
市川崑物語...哈哈~ 比我想像中的輕鬆很多很多
觀眾都是從岩井俊二的角度來看這位他所景仰的導演，
岩井以他的口吻敘述市川的一生，
雖然可能不算公正啦，不過頗有味道的，
不會太超過的讚頌，也不會太刻意的隱瞞什麼，
加上市川崑本身也是個幽默的人，
整部片看下來輕輕鬆鬆的，而且又覺得很值得。
電影的配樂跟畫面的剪接十分的契合又讓人覺得有趣，
貫穿全劇的口白，出現在黑底白字的螢幕上，也讓人覺得很有味道。
渴，這部片我一開始就想看，可是以為時間無法配合，就放棄了，
結果意外發現剛剛好可以接著看~因為市川崑是一部輕鬆的片的關係吧!
渴是一部比想像中更沉重、更深刻的片子，不同於前兩部，批判性十足，
電影的每一個鏡頭、場景，都有導演很強烈的主觀想法在內，
不過還是很好看。
渴當中，大至可以看到對於戰爭、種族糾紛以及種種道德批判等，
小至可以看到他們一家族對於權威的一種反抗，同時也是一種信賴。
當然貫穿全劇的這個字"渴"不僅僅描寫了在荒漠中生活渴求自來飲水的欲望
同時也表達了家中的每個孩子們對於自由、未知未來的渴求與嚮往。
只不過結局，我到目前為止還是沒能看懂，
在回想當中，好像那些片段就這麼的淡掉了，真希望能夠有人來分析一下> <
新光劇院比我想像中的稍稍好找了一點~
所以沒有迷路^^
台北電影節真的是個好物，可以看到好多平日看不到的片阿!!
之後還有四天! 期待~~
6/22/2008
[movie]鋼鐵人iron man
嗯...雖然並不是我期待的片子，
但或許也是因為期待不高，所以覺得還挺好看的。
不像我想的那麼膚淺?
希望不要有人罵我XD
本來以為就是蜘蛛人之類的片子，
但是加入了對於美國軍火業的一番省思，
雖然不算多，但是跟蜘蛛人的故事情節加起來混一下，還是有不錯的迴響。
主角是個天才機械發明家，擁有全世界最大的軍火業的黃金單身漢，
三十幾歲了還玩世不恭的樣子，好像還蠻吸引美女的，
本來是個對於從事軍火業頗理直氣壯，完全沒有道德上顧慮的人，
經過一次的意外而改變了原本的態度，
ㄧ次軍事基地的新武器試爆，原本帶來的該是更多的商機，
然而他卻意外的遭到攻擊，
醒來之後，因為流彈侵襲，必須靠特定能源裝置維生
事實上，他被恐怖份子綁架，要求幫他們製造武器，
在恐怖份子的基地處，看到了恐怖份子利用他創造出來的武器來殺人，
憑著他的天才，打造出鋼鐵人的原型順利逃脫。
到這邊為止，其實我比較期待他在這被囚禁這幾天的一些反思，
沒想到重點是著重於之後他逃出來後的一連串英雄行徑，
事實上...這讓我有點orz
回到了美國之後，他立刻下令停止製造武器，當然引起來喧然大波
然後埋頭完成了完整的鋼鐵人，
之後@#$#*$(反正就是英雄之類的)
最後還很戲劇化的當著眾媒體面前承認自己是鋼鐵人XD
總之我覺得不錯的地方是，他明確的點出軍火業暗中進行的一些非法交易，
也就是所謂的雙線交易，一方面跟政府交好，另ㄧ方面又大量的出口武器給恐怖份子，
然後再從中圖利。
另外鋼鐵人的外型很炫，加上有不少笑點(不論是真的可笑或是好笑)
再加上主角本人的個性....怎麼講...
男人不壞女人不愛，所以就是有點壞壞的，
但又挺討喜的。
所以不失為ㄧ部單純解壓的好片。
[空]突然
措手不及。
上個禮拜四晚上終於考完試了
隨意的用了好久好久沒用的msn
沒想到卻迎來一個我從來沒思考過的可能情況 即使它是如此的糟糕
或許也就是因為糟糕的無以附加 所以沒有想過它的可能性吧。
國中的好友去世了。
說是好友，隨著國中畢業、高中畢業也失去了連絡，
最大的原因可能是在於，我們一個上高中、一個上高職，
完完全全不同的路，
幾次國中同學會的缺席，也有從其他同學口中聽說他已經在工作了，
我以為
我們會一起長大，然後，就像約定的那樣
雖然我們幾乎是失聯了。
等到聽到這個消息的10秒鐘之後，
我忍不住的掉淚，當時已經是晚上十一點多，
不過事實上，他上個禮拜，不知是星期幾的時候就突然的離開了。
而我很確信我一點感覺都沒有，
雖然這也是當然的，畢竟我也沒有超能力
只是，我真的真的好難過。
但我發現一件更可悲的事情，
當我回過頭想找ㄧ些跟他有關的回憶，
那些ㄧ起經歷過事情的片段，通通想不起來，
只剩下畢業紀念冊上的兩張合照，
還有他留給我的一紙畢業留言。
其他的? ㄧ起回家的記憶?
ㄧ起做科展得獎?
ㄧ起參加畢業旅行?
其實，我們幾乎做什麼都同一組吧。
還有他呆呆的喜歡上我朋友，跟我訴苦的記憶。
結果是我的過分刻意與做作，
讓這些實際經歷的過往蒸發消散的無影無蹤。
不拍照、不連絡，甚至生日卡片也沒有寫。
就這樣
只是
他應該還是過的很好，
聽得出來他應該有不少朋友，
當然也希望他的工作順利，
不知道是不是真的如此?
不過，再怎麼關心，是不是還是顯得多餘阿...
而且還有些事情，沒有談開，就這樣模糊下去，
當ㄧ切變得更是如此模糊之後，
卻又讓我很在意，
當初就讓他這樣過去，我真的無法決定。
但這是一個特別的朋友。
讓我覺得我怎麼會可笑的去斷了聯繫?
然而還是ㄧ樣，我遲到了，
我一如以往的任性、恣肆，
結果每當我一想起來，心就很痛。
6/19/2008
[紀錄]社會心理學名詞
社會心理學
解讀
個體差異
根本歸因誤差 fundamental attribution error: 低估外在社會環境影響
行為主義:忽略個人情感 20世紀以前
完型心理學 Gestalt Psychology :重視元素連結
自尊 self-esteem
社會認知 social cognition: 20th~ 正確觀察世界、維護正向自我
基模架構 schemas： 組織特定主題之知識的心理架構
敵意媒體現象 hostile media phenomenon
初始效應 primacy effect 第一印象
固著效應 perseverance effect 深信不疑
自證式預言 self-fulfilling prophecy
便利法則 availability heuristic
判斷法則 judgemental heuristic
虛擬式思考 counterfactual thinking
象徵性法則 representativeness heuristic 相似性
基底比例資訊 base rate information
定錨與調整法則 anchoring and adjustment heuristic
偏差抽樣 biased sampling
認知吝嗇鬼 cognitive misers
主動的謀略家 motivated tacticians
自動化思考 automatic processing 兩階段思考模式
控制式思考 controlled processing
抑制思考 thought suppression
過度自信的障礙 overconfidence barrier
社會知覺 social perception
非語言溝通 nonverbal communication
編碼 encode
解碼 decode
表達規則 display rules
混合的情緒 affect blends
標記 emblems
社會角色理論 social role theory 女性解讀非語言溝通> 男性＞角色期望
內隱人格理論 implicit personality theory 了解他人的基模 受文化影響ex:波希米亞、世故
浮現速度 accessibility 越快的
提示作用 priming 近期發生的
人際歸因理論 attribution theory 自認合理的解釋
內向歸因＆外向歸因(情境) 人格、態度/情境
非共同效應 noncommon effects
類別基礎的期望 category-based expectancy
目標基礎的期望 target-based expectancy
共變模式 convariation level 在對特定對象做出歸因前
共識性資訊 consensus 特殊性資訊 distinctiveness 一致性資訊 consistency
知覺顯著性 perceptual salience 焦點集中在行動者
歸因的兩階段歷程 two-step process
當事者與旁觀者之別
actor & observer difference 他人:個性 自己:情境
自取式歸因 self-serving attributions 維持正向 成功:內向 失敗:外向
防衛式歸因 defensive attributions 世事無常使人受威脅
不切實際的樂觀 unrealistic optimism
公平世界的信念 belief in a just world
自我概念 self-concept
自我察覺 self-awareness
獨立的自我觀 independent view of the self
互賴的自我觀 interdependent view of the self
內省 introspection 思考自己的想法感受和動機的歷程
自我察覺理論 self-awareness theory
因果理論 causal theory
原因所導致的態度改變 reasons-generated atitude change
解讀
個體差異
根本歸因誤差 fundamental attribution error: 低估外在社會環境影響
行為主義:忽略個人情感 20世紀以前
完型心理學 Gestalt Psychology :重視元素連結
自尊 self-esteem
社會認知 social cognition: 20th~ 正確觀察世界、維護正向自我
基模架構 schemas： 組織特定主題之知識的心理架構
敵意媒體現象 hostile media phenomenon
初始效應 primacy effect 第一印象
固著效應 perseverance effect 深信不疑
自證式預言 self-fulfilling prophecy
便利法則 availability heuristic
判斷法則 judgemental heuristic
虛擬式思考 counterfactual thinking
象徵性法則 representativeness heuristic 相似性
基底比例資訊 base rate information
定錨與調整法則 anchoring and adjustment heuristic
偏差抽樣 biased sampling
認知吝嗇鬼 cognitive misers
主動的謀略家 motivated tacticians
自動化思考 automatic processing 兩階段思考模式
控制式思考 controlled processing
抑制思考 thought suppression
過度自信的障礙 overconfidence barrier
社會知覺 social perception
非語言溝通 nonverbal communication
編碼 encode
解碼 decode
表達規則 display rules
混合的情緒 affect blends
標記 emblems
社會角色理論 social role theory 女性解讀非語言溝通> 男性＞角色期望
內隱人格理論 implicit personality theory 了解他人的基模 受文化影響ex:波希米亞、世故
浮現速度 accessibility 越快的
提示作用 priming 近期發生的
人際歸因理論 attribution theory 自認合理的解釋
內向歸因＆外向歸因(情境) 人格、態度/情境
非共同效應 noncommon effects
類別基礎的期望 category-based expectancy
目標基礎的期望 target-based expectancy
共變模式 convariation level 在對特定對象做出歸因前
共識性資訊 consensus 特殊性資訊 distinctiveness 一致性資訊 consistency
知覺顯著性 perceptual salience 焦點集中在行動者
歸因的兩階段歷程 two-step process
當事者與旁觀者之別
actor & observer difference 他人:個性 自己:情境
自取式歸因 self-serving attributions 維持正向 成功:內向 失敗:外向
防衛式歸因 defensive attributions 世事無常使人受威脅
不切實際的樂觀 unrealistic optimism
公平世界的信念 belief in a just world
自我概念 self-concept
自我察覺 self-awareness
獨立的自我觀 independent view of the self
互賴的自我觀 interdependent view of the self
內省 introspection 思考自己的想法感受和動機的歷程
自我察覺理論 self-awareness theory
因果理論 causal theory
原因所導致的態度改變 reasons-generated atitude change
[科科]So-called~ typical student emotions~
http://davidtse916.wordpress.com/2007/10/26/typical-student-emotions/
6/13/2008
6/10/2008
[太多]還是...
食物太多會反胃
事情太多會爆掉
新聞太多會討罵
街上小七太多 總讓人溫馨又好笑
桌上剩菜太多 總讓媽媽疑問又沮喪
日曆上空白的日子太多 看起來閒適又舒服
草莓蛋糕上的奶油太多 看起來豐盛卻虛偽
怎麼時間卻總是太少?
聊天的時間
相伴的時間
碎碎念的時間
吵架的時間
擁抱的時間
掉淚的時間
甚至是空白的時間，都有一定的底線
6/06/2008
[TIMES]How Obama Did It
How Obama Did It
Thursday, Jun. 05, 2008
By KAREN TUMULTY
Barack Obama was campaigning last October in South Carolina when he got an
urgent call from Penny Pritzker, the hotel heiress who leads his campaign's
finance committee. About 200 of his biggest fund raisers were meeting in Des
Moines, Iowa, and among them, near panic was setting in. Pritzker's team had
raised money faster than any other campaign ever had. Its candidate was
drawing mega-crowds wherever he went. Yet he was still running at least 20
points behind Hillary Clinton in polls. His above-the-fray brand of politics
just wasn't getting the job done, and some of his top moneymen were urging
him to rethink his strategy, shake up his staff, go negative. You'd better
get here, Pritzker told Obama. And fast.
Obama made an unscheduled appearance that Sunday night and called for a show
of hands from his finance committee. "Can I see how many people in this room
I told that this was going to be easy?" he asked. "If anybody signed up
thinking it was going to be easy, then I didn't make myself clear." A win in
Iowa, Obama promised, would give him the momentum he needed to win across the
map — but his backers wouldn't see much evidence of progress before then.
"We're up against the most formidable team in 25 years," he said. "But we've
got a plan, and we've got to have faith in it."
More than seven months later, that faith has been rewarded. The 2008
presidential campaign has produced its share of surprises, but one of the
most important is that a newcomer from Chicago put together by far the best
political operation of either party. Obama's campaign has been that rare,
frictionless machine that runs with the energy of an insurgency and the
efficiency of a corporation. His team has lacked what his rivals' have
specialized in: there have been no staff shake-ups, no financial crises, no
change in game plan and no visible strife. Even its campaign slogan —
"Change we can believe in" — has remained the same.
How did he do it? How did Obama become the first Democratic insurgent in a
generation or more to knock off the party's Establishment front runner?
Facing an operation as formidable as Clinton's, Obama says in an interview,
"was liberating ... What I'd felt was that we could try some things in a
different way and build an organization that reflected my personality and
what I thought the country was looking for. We didn't have to unlearn a bunch
of bad habits."
When Betsy Myers first met with Obama in his Senate office on Jan. 3, 2007,
about two weeks before he announced he was forming an exploratory committee
to run for President, Obama laid down three ruling principles for his future
chief operating officer: Run the campaign with respect; build it from the
bottom up; and finally, no drama. Myers was struck by how closely Obama had
studied the two campaigns of George W. Bush. "He said he wanted to run our
campaign like a business," says Myers. And in a good business, the customer
is king. Early on, before it had the resources to do much else, the campaign
outsourced a "customer-service center" so that anyone who called, at any hour
of the day or night, would find a human voice on the other end of the line.
Meanwhile, Obama's Chicago headquarters made technology its running mate from
the start. That wasn't just for fund-raising: in state after state, the
campaign turned over its voter lists — normally a closely guarded crown
jewel — to volunteers, who used their own laptops and the unlimited night
and weekend minutes of their cell-phone plans to contact every name and
populate a political organization from the ground up. "The tools were there,
and they built it," says Joe Trippi, who ran Howard Dean's 2004 campaign. "In
a lot of ways, the Dean campaign was like the Wright brothers. Four years
later, we're watching the Apollo project."
Even Obama admits he did not expect the Internet to be such a good friend.
"What I didn't anticipate was how effectively we could use the Internet to
harness that grass-roots base, both on the financial side and the organizing
side," Obama says. "That, I think, was probably one of the biggest surprises
of the campaign, just how powerfully our message merged with the social
networking and the power of the Internet." But three other fundamentals were
crucial to making Obama the Democratic nominee:
A Brave New Party
In most presidential elections, the Iowa caucuses are an anomaly. Competing
there is a complicated, labor-intensive undertaking that, once finished, is
cast off as an oddity and never repeated. But in 2008 it became for Obama the
road test of a youth-oriented, technology-fueled organization and the model
for many of the wins that followed. It was also a challenge to history. The
iron rule of Iowa had always been that caucusgoers tended to look the same
year in and year out: older people, union households, party stalwarts — just
the kind of folks who would seem more inclined to back Clinton or John
Edwards — trudging out into the cold night for a few hours of political
conversation. Instead, Obama saw the Iowa caucuses as a chance to put a stake
through Clinton's inevitability. "Mission No. 1 was finishing ahead of
Hillary Clinton in Iowa," recalls Obama campaign manager David Plouffe. "If
we hadn't done that, it would have been hard to stop her."
But counting on new voters had proved disastrous for Dean in 2004. The Obama
campaign knew that it would have to build a network of Iowans rather than
supporters brought in from other parts of the country, says Plouffe, but "we
didn't have to accept the electorate as it is." At bottom, Obama built a new
party in 2008. It was difficult. Not until the morning of the caucuses did
the campaign reach its goal of 97,000 Iowans pledged to support Obama that it
thought it would need to win. Then came the real question: Would these people
show up?
Show up they did, shattering turnout records. Obama prevailed with a
surprising eight-point margin over Edwards, who came in second. Obama counts
Iowa as his biggest victory, the one that foreshadowed the rest. "Voters
under 30 participated at the same rates as voters over 65. That had never
happened before," the Democratic nominee says. "That continues to be
something I'm very proud of — how we've expanded the voter rolls in every
state where we've campaigned. I think that means we can put into play some
states that might normally not be in play."
The Iowa playbook, as everyone now knows, hasn't always worked. In Texas, for
instance, the grass-roots operation counted on more African-American voters
than actually turned out. In California, organizers expected more young
voters. But while Obama rarely managed a clean win against Clinton in the big
states — the ones that will count most in the fall — he kept winning
delegates even when he lost primaries. By April, it became almost
mathematically impossible for Clinton to catch him.
The Key-Chain Campaign
Atlanta businessman Kirk Dornbush has raised millions of dollars for the
Democratic Party and its candidates over the past 16 years. Before
campaign-finance laws banned unregulated soft money, he recalls, there were
times he walked around with six-figure checks in both pockets of his jacket.
But these days, he does much of his fund-raising in a much humbler fashion:
selling $3 key chains and $25 T shirts at Obama rallies. At the first
merchandise table Dornbush set up for a Georgia event, "we were just
completely sold out," he says. "There were lines of people. It was
unbelievable."
Dornbush's experience explains the second fundamental change Obama has
brought to politics: his campaign was built from the bottom up. Even
fund-raising, once the realm of the richest in politics, became a grass-roots
organizational tool. At nearly every event this year, Team Obama set up
little tabletop trinket shops, known as "chum stores" because all those
little Obama-branded doodads aren't only keepsakes; they are also bait. Every
person who buys a button or hat is recorded as a campaign donor. But the real
goal of the chum operations was building a list of workers, supporters and
their e-mail addresses.
A similar innovation came in fund-raising. Normally, it is only the big
donors who get quality time with a candidate. But Obama devoted far more of
his schedule to small-dollar events. In Kentucky, the month after he
announced his run for President, the first such effort quickly sold out all
3,200 tickets at $25 a head — and produced the beginning of a local
organization. "It's the difference between hunting and farming," says Obama
moneyman Matthew Barzun, 37, the Louisville Internet-publishing entrepreneur
who arranged the event. "You plant a seed, and you get much more."
Obama uses a different frame of reference. "As somebody who had been a
community organizer," Obama recalls, "I was convinced that if you invited
people to get engaged, if you weren't trying to campaign like you were
selling soap but instead said, 'This is your campaign, you own it, and you
can run with it,' that people would respond and we could build a new
electoral map." The chum stores, the e-mail obsession and the way Obama
organizations sprang up organically in almost every congressional district in
the country meant that by the time Obama's field organizers arrived in a
state, all they had to do was fire up an engine that had already been
designed and built locally. "We had to rely on the grass roots, and we had
clarity on that from the beginning," says Plouffe.
By contrast, the Clinton campaign, which started out with superior resources
and the mantle of inevitability, was a top-down operation in which
decision-making rested with a small coterie of longtime aides. Her state
organizers often got mixed signals from the headquarters near Washington.
Decisions from Hillaryland often came too late for her field organization to
execute. Obama's bottom-up philosophy also helps explain why he was able to
sweep the organization-heavy caucus states, which were so crucial to building
up his insurmountable lead in pledged delegates. What was not appreciated by
many at the time: while Clinton spent heavily in every state she contested,
Obama's approach saved money. Says Dean-campaign veteran Trippi: "His
volunteers were organizing his caucus victories for free."
Obama Means No Drama
The team that Obama put together was a mix of people who, for the most part,
had never worked together before but behaved as if they had. Some — like
chief strategist David Axelrod and adviser Valerie Jarrett — came from
Chicago and had advised Obama in earlier races. Axelrod's business partner
Plouffe had worked in former House Democratic leader Dick Gephardt's
operation; deputy campaign manager Steve Hildebrand, who oversaw the field
organization, had come from former Senate majority leader Tom Daschle's.
Daschle's former chief of staff Pete Rouse served that same role in Obama's
Senate office, from which the candidate also brought aboard communications
director Robert Gibbs, who had briefly worked for John Kerry. Obama tapped
the business world as well, filling key operational posts with executives who
had worked for Orbitz, McDonald's and other firms.
And yet, Obama says, they all had the same philosophy. "Because I was not
favored, that meant that the people who signed up for this campaign really
believed in what the campaign was about. So they weren't mercenaries. They
weren't coming in to just attach to a campaign," he explains. Temperament
mattered too. "It was very important to have a consistent team," Obama says,
"a circle of people who were collaborative and nondefensive."
Like the team around Bush, Obama's is watertight. Leaks are rare, and for all
the millions Obama has raked in, Plouffe keeps a sharp eye on where it is
going. Consider the salaries: Clinton spokesman Howard Wolfson was paid
almost twice as much in a month — $266,000 went to his firm, according to
her January campaign filing — as the $144,000 that Obama paid Gibbs for all
of last year. Obama staffers are expected to double up in hotel rooms when
they are on the road and are reimbursed by the campaign if they take the
subway (about $2) to the downtown-Chicago campaign headquarters from O'Hare
International Airport but not if they take a cab (about $50). Volunteers are
asked to take along their own food when they are canvassing.
How will a team that has been living off the land fare against the kind of
GOP operation that was so effective at turning out the traditional Republican
base in 2004? John McCain's campaign manager, Rick Davis, flatly declares
that what got Obama the nomination "is not a general-election strategy" and
contends that Obama's operation will be weak against McCain's crossover
appeal in such states as Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Nevada.
Maybe so, but compared with McCain's, Obama's operation has been a model of
efficiency — and executive function. Obama has already changed the way
politics is practiced in America — and he is poised to keep doing so. After
delivering his dramatic victory speech in St. Paul, Minn., Obama walked
offstage and spent the next 45 minutes signing dozens and dozens of his books
that had been brought to the Xcel Center by admirers. When he finished, he
happened to see fund raiser Dornbush and told him, "Enjoy the celebration
tonight." Then Obama took a few steps, turned around and added, "But it's
right back to work tomorrow."
06/06 14:58
Thursday, Jun. 05, 2008
By KAREN TUMULTY
Barack Obama was campaigning last October in South Carolina when he got an
urgent call from Penny Pritzker, the hotel heiress who leads his campaign's
finance committee. About 200 of his biggest fund raisers were meeting in Des
Moines, Iowa, and among them, near panic was setting in. Pritzker's team had
raised money faster than any other campaign ever had. Its candidate was
drawing mega-crowds wherever he went. Yet he was still running at least 20
points behind Hillary Clinton in polls. His above-the-fray brand of politics
just wasn't getting the job done, and some of his top moneymen were urging
him to rethink his strategy, shake up his staff, go negative. You'd better
get here, Pritzker told Obama. And fast.
Obama made an unscheduled appearance that Sunday night and called for a show
of hands from his finance committee. "Can I see how many people in this room
I told that this was going to be easy?" he asked. "If anybody signed up
thinking it was going to be easy, then I didn't make myself clear." A win in
Iowa, Obama promised, would give him the momentum he needed to win across the
map — but his backers wouldn't see much evidence of progress before then.
"We're up against the most formidable team in 25 years," he said. "But we've
got a plan, and we've got to have faith in it."
More than seven months later, that faith has been rewarded. The 2008
presidential campaign has produced its share of surprises, but one of the
most important is that a newcomer from Chicago put together by far the best
political operation of either party. Obama's campaign has been that rare,
frictionless machine that runs with the energy of an insurgency and the
efficiency of a corporation. His team has lacked what his rivals' have
specialized in: there have been no staff shake-ups, no financial crises, no
change in game plan and no visible strife. Even its campaign slogan —
"Change we can believe in" — has remained the same.
How did he do it? How did Obama become the first Democratic insurgent in a
generation or more to knock off the party's Establishment front runner?
Facing an operation as formidable as Clinton's, Obama says in an interview,
"was liberating ... What I'd felt was that we could try some things in a
different way and build an organization that reflected my personality and
what I thought the country was looking for. We didn't have to unlearn a bunch
of bad habits."
When Betsy Myers first met with Obama in his Senate office on Jan. 3, 2007,
about two weeks before he announced he was forming an exploratory committee
to run for President, Obama laid down three ruling principles for his future
chief operating officer: Run the campaign with respect; build it from the
bottom up; and finally, no drama. Myers was struck by how closely Obama had
studied the two campaigns of George W. Bush. "He said he wanted to run our
campaign like a business," says Myers. And in a good business, the customer
is king. Early on, before it had the resources to do much else, the campaign
outsourced a "customer-service center" so that anyone who called, at any hour
of the day or night, would find a human voice on the other end of the line.
Meanwhile, Obama's Chicago headquarters made technology its running mate from
the start. That wasn't just for fund-raising: in state after state, the
campaign turned over its voter lists — normally a closely guarded crown
jewel — to volunteers, who used their own laptops and the unlimited night
and weekend minutes of their cell-phone plans to contact every name and
populate a political organization from the ground up. "The tools were there,
and they built it," says Joe Trippi, who ran Howard Dean's 2004 campaign. "In
a lot of ways, the Dean campaign was like the Wright brothers. Four years
later, we're watching the Apollo project."
Even Obama admits he did not expect the Internet to be such a good friend.
"What I didn't anticipate was how effectively we could use the Internet to
harness that grass-roots base, both on the financial side and the organizing
side," Obama says. "That, I think, was probably one of the biggest surprises
of the campaign, just how powerfully our message merged with the social
networking and the power of the Internet." But three other fundamentals were
crucial to making Obama the Democratic nominee:
A Brave New Party
In most presidential elections, the Iowa caucuses are an anomaly. Competing
there is a complicated, labor-intensive undertaking that, once finished, is
cast off as an oddity and never repeated. But in 2008 it became for Obama the
road test of a youth-oriented, technology-fueled organization and the model
for many of the wins that followed. It was also a challenge to history. The
iron rule of Iowa had always been that caucusgoers tended to look the same
year in and year out: older people, union households, party stalwarts — just
the kind of folks who would seem more inclined to back Clinton or John
Edwards — trudging out into the cold night for a few hours of political
conversation. Instead, Obama saw the Iowa caucuses as a chance to put a stake
through Clinton's inevitability. "Mission No. 1 was finishing ahead of
Hillary Clinton in Iowa," recalls Obama campaign manager David Plouffe. "If
we hadn't done that, it would have been hard to stop her."
But counting on new voters had proved disastrous for Dean in 2004. The Obama
campaign knew that it would have to build a network of Iowans rather than
supporters brought in from other parts of the country, says Plouffe, but "we
didn't have to accept the electorate as it is." At bottom, Obama built a new
party in 2008. It was difficult. Not until the morning of the caucuses did
the campaign reach its goal of 97,000 Iowans pledged to support Obama that it
thought it would need to win. Then came the real question: Would these people
show up?
Show up they did, shattering turnout records. Obama prevailed with a
surprising eight-point margin over Edwards, who came in second. Obama counts
Iowa as his biggest victory, the one that foreshadowed the rest. "Voters
under 30 participated at the same rates as voters over 65. That had never
happened before," the Democratic nominee says. "That continues to be
something I'm very proud of — how we've expanded the voter rolls in every
state where we've campaigned. I think that means we can put into play some
states that might normally not be in play."
The Iowa playbook, as everyone now knows, hasn't always worked. In Texas, for
instance, the grass-roots operation counted on more African-American voters
than actually turned out. In California, organizers expected more young
voters. But while Obama rarely managed a clean win against Clinton in the big
states — the ones that will count most in the fall — he kept winning
delegates even when he lost primaries. By April, it became almost
mathematically impossible for Clinton to catch him.
The Key-Chain Campaign
Atlanta businessman Kirk Dornbush has raised millions of dollars for the
Democratic Party and its candidates over the past 16 years. Before
campaign-finance laws banned unregulated soft money, he recalls, there were
times he walked around with six-figure checks in both pockets of his jacket.
But these days, he does much of his fund-raising in a much humbler fashion:
selling $3 key chains and $25 T shirts at Obama rallies. At the first
merchandise table Dornbush set up for a Georgia event, "we were just
completely sold out," he says. "There were lines of people. It was
unbelievable."
Dornbush's experience explains the second fundamental change Obama has
brought to politics: his campaign was built from the bottom up. Even
fund-raising, once the realm of the richest in politics, became a grass-roots
organizational tool. At nearly every event this year, Team Obama set up
little tabletop trinket shops, known as "chum stores" because all those
little Obama-branded doodads aren't only keepsakes; they are also bait. Every
person who buys a button or hat is recorded as a campaign donor. But the real
goal of the chum operations was building a list of workers, supporters and
their e-mail addresses.
A similar innovation came in fund-raising. Normally, it is only the big
donors who get quality time with a candidate. But Obama devoted far more of
his schedule to small-dollar events. In Kentucky, the month after he
announced his run for President, the first such effort quickly sold out all
3,200 tickets at $25 a head — and produced the beginning of a local
organization. "It's the difference between hunting and farming," says Obama
moneyman Matthew Barzun, 37, the Louisville Internet-publishing entrepreneur
who arranged the event. "You plant a seed, and you get much more."
Obama uses a different frame of reference. "As somebody who had been a
community organizer," Obama recalls, "I was convinced that if you invited
people to get engaged, if you weren't trying to campaign like you were
selling soap but instead said, 'This is your campaign, you own it, and you
can run with it,' that people would respond and we could build a new
electoral map." The chum stores, the e-mail obsession and the way Obama
organizations sprang up organically in almost every congressional district in
the country meant that by the time Obama's field organizers arrived in a
state, all they had to do was fire up an engine that had already been
designed and built locally. "We had to rely on the grass roots, and we had
clarity on that from the beginning," says Plouffe.
By contrast, the Clinton campaign, which started out with superior resources
and the mantle of inevitability, was a top-down operation in which
decision-making rested with a small coterie of longtime aides. Her state
organizers often got mixed signals from the headquarters near Washington.
Decisions from Hillaryland often came too late for her field organization to
execute. Obama's bottom-up philosophy also helps explain why he was able to
sweep the organization-heavy caucus states, which were so crucial to building
up his insurmountable lead in pledged delegates. What was not appreciated by
many at the time: while Clinton spent heavily in every state she contested,
Obama's approach saved money. Says Dean-campaign veteran Trippi: "His
volunteers were organizing his caucus victories for free."
Obama Means No Drama
The team that Obama put together was a mix of people who, for the most part,
had never worked together before but behaved as if they had. Some — like
chief strategist David Axelrod and adviser Valerie Jarrett — came from
Chicago and had advised Obama in earlier races. Axelrod's business partner
Plouffe had worked in former House Democratic leader Dick Gephardt's
operation; deputy campaign manager Steve Hildebrand, who oversaw the field
organization, had come from former Senate majority leader Tom Daschle's.
Daschle's former chief of staff Pete Rouse served that same role in Obama's
Senate office, from which the candidate also brought aboard communications
director Robert Gibbs, who had briefly worked for John Kerry. Obama tapped
the business world as well, filling key operational posts with executives who
had worked for Orbitz, McDonald's and other firms.
And yet, Obama says, they all had the same philosophy. "Because I was not
favored, that meant that the people who signed up for this campaign really
believed in what the campaign was about. So they weren't mercenaries. They
weren't coming in to just attach to a campaign," he explains. Temperament
mattered too. "It was very important to have a consistent team," Obama says,
"a circle of people who were collaborative and nondefensive."
Like the team around Bush, Obama's is watertight. Leaks are rare, and for all
the millions Obama has raked in, Plouffe keeps a sharp eye on where it is
going. Consider the salaries: Clinton spokesman Howard Wolfson was paid
almost twice as much in a month — $266,000 went to his firm, according to
her January campaign filing — as the $144,000 that Obama paid Gibbs for all
of last year. Obama staffers are expected to double up in hotel rooms when
they are on the road and are reimbursed by the campaign if they take the
subway (about $2) to the downtown-Chicago campaign headquarters from O'Hare
International Airport but not if they take a cab (about $50). Volunteers are
asked to take along their own food when they are canvassing.
How will a team that has been living off the land fare against the kind of
GOP operation that was so effective at turning out the traditional Republican
base in 2004? John McCain's campaign manager, Rick Davis, flatly declares
that what got Obama the nomination "is not a general-election strategy" and
contends that Obama's operation will be weak against McCain's crossover
appeal in such states as Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Nevada.
Maybe so, but compared with McCain's, Obama's operation has been a model of
efficiency — and executive function. Obama has already changed the way
politics is practiced in America — and he is poised to keep doing so. After
delivering his dramatic victory speech in St. Paul, Minn., Obama walked
offstage and spent the next 45 minutes signing dozens and dozens of his books
that had been brought to the Xcel Center by admirers. When he finished, he
happened to see fund raiser Dornbush and told him, "Enjoy the celebration
tonight." Then Obama took a few steps, turned around and added, "But it's
right back to work tomorrow."
06/06 14:58
[期末]層層疊疊的...
Next Week
----------------------------
@English Li.
選這兩題。
2. After reading T. S. Eliot’s “J. Alfred Prufrock’s Love Song,” can I, as one living in a high-tech world almost one hundred years away from T. S. Eliot’s, still preserve a romantic notion of love? Why or Why not?
5. Have you ever taken a city walk in Taipei? Did that walk provide you with an experience of “epiphany”? If so, describe such a walk while keeping in mind James Joyce’s Ulysses, which is also about adventures in a metropolis leading to “epiphany”.
@Interview
@初日期末考 CH.7
@心理學出題 6/13考
第12、13章全部
第14章 480頁以後
第15章 526-529頁
第19章 692-694頁
@考體育 慢跑
Next*2 Week
---------------------------
第三世界政治 期末考
Next*3 Week
----------------------------
口譯 期末考
社會心理學 期末考 & 期末報告
5/31/2008
[電影]行程
本來想要買套票的，卻發現想看的就那幾部，
所以作罷~，以下是初步可以去看想看的電影的日期&時間
6/22 Sun
新光一廳
1040 無用
1230 市川崑物語
6/25 Wed
中山堂
1700 請對我承諾
6/26 Thur
中山堂
2010 傷心蔚藍海
6/27 Fri
中山堂
1330 距離57000公里
7/5 Sat
中山堂
1600 自由國度
這個蠻好用的~
參考:
2008台北電影節
http://www.taipeiff.org/Default.aspx
某電影達人的blog 選片指南
http://www.wretch.cc/blog/davidlean/8777101
所以作罷~，以下是初步可以去看想看的電影的日期&時間
6/22 Sun
新光一廳
1040 無用
1230 市川崑物語
6/25 Wed
中山堂
1700 請對我承諾
6/26 Thur
中山堂
2010 傷心蔚藍海
6/27 Fri
中山堂
1330 距離57000公里
7/5 Sat
中山堂
1600 自由國度
這個蠻好用的~
參考:
2008台北電影節
http://www.taipeiff.org/Default.aspx
某電影達人的blog 選片指南
http://www.wretch.cc/blog/davidlean/8777101
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